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IN THE S.UPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD W·HIPPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
- vs.HAROLD FULLER,
Defendant and Appellant
- vs.DON C. CHRISTENSEN,
Third Party Defendant and
Respondent

Case
No. 8409

Plaintiff and Respondent's Brief

The defendant Harold Fuller entered into a contract with
the third party defendant Don C. Christensen, a licensed contractor, for the remodeling of the former's residence at 105
"B'' Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, for $5,770.00. The defendant
did not require t~ contractor to furnish a bond pursuant to .t
}! "''f4tff .tJ,t_l!"~~ 9il(t.f:..~eil:,.... c.pnt-Yc.c:
the mandate of ection 4-~-1, -u. C. P/..., 1950. 1\.On JUlle 3,
1951, the said Don C. Christensen entered into a contract with
-J
~~ fu .II) 1,s.l. .P 1 A t ~' T./' s d 'I c:f ~q T_(f', let I.J. tJs7ur
the plaintiff, a licensed plunfber,l\to do certain plumbing work
for the sum of $1,513.00. The contract provided that any additional materials or labor furnished upon request would be
paid for at a price mutually agreed upon by the parties. The
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Plaintiff fully performed said contract and furnished additional
material at the agreed price of $133.50. The defendant paid
the. third party defendant in full but the latter went bankrupt
and did not pay the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded
judgment for $1,303.00, the amount of the wholesale price of
the materials and extras furnished by the plaintiff. The defendant appeals and the plaintiff cross-appeals for judgment
for the full amount.
STATEME,NT OF POINTS

I
THE PLAlNTfFF IS NOT SUIN1G ON HIS C~ONTRACT
O~F JUNE 3, 1951, BUT ON H'I S CAU~SE O~F ACTI,ON UNDE:R SE~CTI,O·N:S 14- 2 -1 AN:D 14- 2- 2, U. C. A., 1953.
H1E IS EiN·~ITLE~D TO· R:E:C,O·VER B·Y VIRTUE OF SAID
STAT~UTE EVEN THO:U,G·H HE MI,OHT BE B·A·RRED FR01
M
ENFOR·CI,.N,G H~IS ~CONTRACT B·E,CAUSE 01F NOT HEI~NG
A LI'C'E,N,SED C:ONTRA·CTOR UNDER SE1CTI~0'N 58-6-10,
U. ~C. A., 1953, ALTH'0'U'GH HE WAS L'IC,ENSE'D A:S A
PUUMB·ER UN'.DER SE1C.~IO·N 58-18-2, u. ·C. A., 1953.
1

II
THE

C~OINTR·ACT

PR,ICE O·F

T~H~E

M·EHOHANiD,JSV

A~N·D

M:ATERIA,LS FURNirS~H'ED AND SERV:I'CE'S REN'DERE·D
WAS T HE REASO~NAB,LE VAL'UE OF T:HE SArME.
1

ARGU~MENT

I
'frHE. P.LAINTriFF IS NOT SUING ON HIS CONTRACT
()F JUN~E· 3, 1951, B UT ON-HilS CAUSE OF ACTION U·N:DER
1

SECTI·O:NS 14-2--1 AN D 14-2-·2,
1

u. c.

A., 1953.

HE' IS EN-
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TIT~LED

TO RECOVER BY VIRT'U'E O·F SAID STATUTE

EVEN THOIU·GH HE MIIGHT BE BARREID FRO!M ENFORCIN~G HJIS CO·NT·RA~CT BEICAIUSE O~F N:OT B'EING
A LI CENSED C01NTRA~CTOR UNDER SECTION 58-6-10,
U. C. A., 1953, AL TH·OIU·GH HE WAS LI1CENSEiD AS A
PLUM!BER U·ND~ER SECTION 58-18-2, U. C. A., 1953.
1

14-2-1, U. C. A., 1953, states:

''The owner of any interest in land entering a contract . . . for the construction, addition to, or alteration
or repair of, any building . . . shall, before any such
work is commenced, obtain from the contractor a bond
. . . conditioned for the faithful performance of the
contract and prompt payment for material furnished
and lahar perform.ed under the contract ... ; and any
person who has furnished materials or performed labor
for or upon any such building . . . payment for which
has not been made, shall have a direct right of action
against the sureties upon such bond for the reasonable
value of the materials furnished or labor performed,
not exceeding . . . the price agreed upon ... " (Italics
supplied by the respondent).
It will be noted from the wording of the statute that the
clear intent is to assure payment to any person who furnishes
materials and labor. No distinction is made as to whether that
person is to be a sub-contractor, mechanic or materialman, licensed or unlicensed.
Liberty Coal and Lumber Co. vs. Snow, 53 U. 298. 178 Pac.
341, said that the purpose of this particular statute was to prevent owners of land from having their lands improved with
materials and labor furnished and performed by third persons,
and thus enhance the value of such lands, without becoming
personally responsible for the reasonable value of materials

and. labor.
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14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953, says:
"Any person subject to the provisions of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and sufficient
bond ... shall be personally liable to all persons who
have furnished materials or performed labor under
the contract for the reasonable value . . . " (Italics supplied by respondent).
In this case, it is true that the defendant paid the prime
contractor in full, but he failed to protect third parties as required by law and for his neglect or failure the law requires
that he pay twice, if need be, to assure the third party of his
just due and to compensate for failure to furnish adequate
protection for interested persons.

The law places this respon-

sibility upon the owner as the one who gains the most by the
improvements and the one who is in the best position to require security to protect third parties.

Instead of penalizing

the offender by fine as is the case in the statutes regulating
plumbers and contractors, the state subjects the offender to
double payment, a greater penalty ordinarily than the fines for
failure to procure either a contractor's license or a plumber"s
license, clearly evidencing the legislature's concern that all
,who provide improvements be paid for the same.
The issue in this case, so far as the defendant's appeal
is concerned, is whether the "any person" and "all persons"
respectively of Sections 14-2-1 and 14-·2-2, U. C. A., 1953, are
to be construed as restricted to a special group as contended
for the defendant (see Page 11 of defendant's Brief) or construed to mean as they say "any person" and all persons" respectively "who furnish materials or labor."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The defendant cites no cases which create such judicial
exceptions as he urges and in their absence the plaintiff urges
this court to construe the language in the light of its plain
meaning.
Even if Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, are to be construed
as benefiting only those who

hold the requisite

licenses

for furnishing the materials and doing the work for which they
sue under that statute, the plaintiff respectfully submits that he
was licensed to do all that he did and for which he herein sues.
The evidence is uncontradicted and the defendant has
stipulated to the fact that the plaintiff was, at all times in question, a licensed plumber and had complied with the requirements set forth in 58-18-2 (a) of U. C. A., 1953, which provides:
"Each applicant for a certificate to engage in the
trade of plumbing as a journeyman plumber, must produce satisfactory evidence of good moral character and
pass a satisfactory examination under the rules and regulations of the department of registration.''
A "journeyman plumber" is defined in 58-18-5 (a) as follows:
"A person who has passed the examination herein provided
and whose name is duly registered with the department of registration as a journeyman plumber."
The "trade of plumbing" is defined in 58-18-5 (c), U. C. A.,
1953, as follows: c:c:The performing of any mechanical work pertaining to the installation, alteration, change, repair, removal,
maintenance and use in buildings . . . of pipes, fixtures and
fittings for bringing in the water supply and removing . . .
water carried wastees ... "
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These statutes constitute a police regulation enacted to protect public interests as much or more than the "contracting"
statutes relied on by the defendant.
In this instance the plaintiff installed two bathtubs, two
toilets, two wash basins, four kitchen sinks and water and drain
pipes necessary for installation of the mentioned items, all
of which was work clearly within the purview of the statute
regulating the "trade of plumbing" as herein set forth.
The legislature did not say or intend to say, as the defendant would have us believe, that before a license! plumber
can contract to do plumbing he has to be licensed also as a
contractor. If that were so, then all plumbers working for
themselves must also be licensed ·contractors, for then all work
done by them would come within the classification of contractor or sub-contractor.
The defendant argues that the legislature intended the
construction he is advancing by citing 58-18-14,

·u.

C. A., 1953,

(regulating plumbers) as follows: "The general provisions of
Title 58 . . . including the prohibitions and penalties thereof,
shall be applicable to the administration and enforcement of
this aot, in so far as they are not in conflict herewith." There is
no ambiguity here in what was intended.
both contractors and plumbers.

Tttle 58 regulates

58-1-1 to and including 39

is entitled "General PrQvisions." These provisions apply to
plumbers, but only if they are not in conflict with the chapter
regulating plumbers. There is no indication that the legislature intended by any of said general provisions that licensed
plumbers are also to be licensed as contractors, as the defendant
contends. Had such been the legislative intent, it is difficult
to understand why such requirement was not expressly stated.
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The defendant places great stress on the following sections within the contractors statute, U. 'C. A. 1953: 58-6-1 Li'
'
cense to Do Business; 58-6-3, '~Contractor" Defined; and 58-6-10,
Violation of Act- Penalty.
Dow vs. United States, a 1946 case originating in Utah,
involved an unlicensed sub-contractor who had fully performed
his sub-contract, which was the excavation of footings for certain
buildings. The prime contractor had been paid for the work
completed, including the work of said sub-contractor but sought
to avoid payment to the sub-contractor on the ground that the
latter was unlicensed. After citing the statutory provisions
relied upo/:the defendant herein the court held: "Neither
these statutory provisions nor any others called to our attention
provide in express language that a contract employing an unlicensed contractor to perform services falling within the field
of his trade shall be unenforceable.n Dow vs. United States,
154 F. 2nd 707, 710.
In short, this case holds that on unlicensed sub-contractor
acting within his field or profession can recover from the prime
conuactor when the work has been fully performed and the
prime contractor has been paid for the complete job, including
the work performed by the sub-contractor.
What appears, from defendant's Brief, Page 5, to be defendant's best case in support of his contention, is Kirman vs.
Borzage, 65 C. A. 2nd 165, 150 Pac. 2nd 3. Quoting defendant,
"The Second District Court of Appeals in applying similar
licensing statutes ruled that a licensed plumber could not maintain any action in the courts resulting from undertaking to
do plumbing work on a contract basis without showing that

the plumber had a contractor's license.''
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In that case, the following fact situation is involved. A
partnership performed extensive plumbing work for the owner
of property. No intermediate party was involved. ·One of
the partners was a licensed master plumber but the partnership·
itself was not licensed either as a plumber or as a contractor.
The California statute provides that it was unlawful for a
partnership or joint venture to contract without first being
separately licensed even if all partners were licensed to operate
individually. Here, then, the partnership is treated as a separate entity, and it was held that the master plumber's license
was not sufficient to remove the case from the operation of
the statute. The court said in effect that a licensed plumber is
licensed to contract individually but not as a partnership unless
the partnership is also licensed.
The general rule that a sub-contractor is within covef>age
of the contractor's bond for not only labor and materials, but
also profit when the contract has been performed is stated in
119 A. L. R. 1282, as follows:
" ... where the sub-contractor has fully performed
his conmact, so that nothing remains but to pay the
contract price, or balance due thereon, the recovery of
profit is not to be denied merely because it is profit
rather than the value of labor and materials furnished;
and the amount of recovery being liquidated under
the contract, the recovery of profit is not to be denied
on the ground that the damages are not ascertained,
as would be the case where the contract is only partly
performed."

II
~HE CONTRACT PRICE OF ~HE MATERIALS FURNISHED AN~D SERVI'C,ES REN:DE·RED WAS THE REASONA·BLE VA'L'U:E O'F TH·E SAME.
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In lower court, the plaintiff testified that he was able to
get the fixtures and materials, which were used on the job, at
wholesale, and that the wholesale price came to approximately
$1,150.00. When asked how he arrived at the contract price
as a basis for his charge, he replied that he had figured a onethird mark-up on the wholesale price which was the custom
of the trade when furnishing materials and fixtures for a job,
and that such mark-up was fair and reasonable. When the sum
of the $383.00 markup and the wholesale price were subtracted
from the total claim leaving a balance of $113.50, the plaintiff
was asked if this latter figure was the amount to be attributed
to the labor for the job.

The plaintiff said that it was.

The

plaintiff further testified that such a figure would not adequately compensate for the amount of labor performed but in
order to submit as low a bid as possible he had to cut the
price somewhere. The price was fixed by bid and the plaintiff
was the lowest bidder in competitive bidding.

Defendant of-

fered no testimony which would justify a conclusion that the
contract price was greater than a fair and reasonable value of
materials furnished and labor performed, and no question was
raised as to the quality of plaintiff's performance.
Even assuming the defendant's contentions are correct and
the plaintiff should be required to take out a contractor's license as well as a plumber's license in order to recover for
his services, that would not prevent the plaintiff from recovering for the materials he furnished.

As a materialman he is

not required to furnish a contractor's license because he does
not come wi·thin the purview of the contractors' statute 58-6-3
(

Contractor Defined) U.

1

c.

A., 1953.
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CONCLUSION
By virtue of 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, U. C. A., 1953, the plaintiff
is entitled to recover from the defendant for the reasonable
value of the fixtures and materials furnished and the labor
performed. The Plaintiff's claim is the reasonaole value and
the lower court erred in granting judgment for a lesser amount.

Respectfully submitted,
MORRIS D.

Y~O~U.NG

and

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
65 East Fourth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
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